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Abstract
We study dynamic cooperative advertising decisions in a market that consists of a fi-
nite number of independent manufacturers and retailers. Each manufacturer sells its
product through all retailers and can offer different levels of advertising support to the
retailers. Each retailer sells every manufacturer’s product and may choose to carry out
a different amount of local advertising effort to promote the products. A manufacturer
may offer to subsidize a fraction of the local advertising expense carried out by a re-
tailer for its product, and this fraction is termed as that manufacturer’s subsidy rate for
that retailer. We model a Stackelberg differential game with manufacturers as leaders
and retailers as followers. A Nash game between the manufacturers determines their
subsidy rates for the retailers and another Nash game between the retailers determines
their optimal advertising efforts for the products they sell in response to manufactur-
ers’ decisions. We obtain optimal policies in feedback form. In some special cases,
we explicitly write the incentives for coop advertising as functions of different model
parameters including the number of manufacturers and retailers, and study the impact
of the competition at the manufacturer and the retailer levels. We analyse the profits
of the players and find the model parameters under which a manufacturer benefits from
a coop advertising program. Furthermore, in the case of two manufacturers and two
retailers, we study the effect of various model parameters on all four subsidy rates. We
also extend our model to include national level advertising by the manufacturer.
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1 Introduction
Cooperative advertising (or coop advertising) is a powerful tool commonly used in marketing
channels where one party in the channel agrees to subsidize the advertising expenditure of
the other. Quite often, the local advertising (such as the advertising in local TV channels,
radio stations, newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, mailing lists, billboards, etc.) is managed
by a local retailer since the retailer is usually better aware of the effectiveness of local
advertising media and has a better understanding of the local preferences and demographics
of the consumers. However, the retailer’s advertising effort might not be enough from the
perspective of the manufacturer due to reasons such as limited budget or a lack of sufficient
incentive for the retailer. The manufacturer may then offer to share a part of retailer’s
advertising expenditure in order to incentivize the retailer to advertise more and both the
parties could benefit from this arrangement due to higher sales. In a typical arrangement,
a manufacturer agrees to share a portion of the local advertising cost of a retailer. In such
a situation, the fraction of the retailer’s advertising cost that the manufacturer agrees to
reimburse is commonly known as the participation rate or the subsidy rate.
The practice of cooperative advertising has seen a significant increase in recent years.
Nagler (2006) estimated that the total expenditure on coop advertising in US was about
$ 0.9 billion in 1970 and had grown to about $ 15 billion in 2000. More recently, some
estimates report that total pool of money available for coop advertising programs in US
exceeds $ 50 billion annually1. Dant and Berger (1996) report that approximately 25-40% of
local advertisements and promotion are funded on a cooperative basis. Karray et al. (2017)
note that about $36 billion are being paid by manufacturers to retailers in cooperative
advertising funds, which represents about 12% of total advertising costs. Dutta et al. (1995)
analyzed data for 2,156 coop advertising plans across 49 product categories and found the
average subsidy rate to be 74.6%. More specifically, they found that average subsidy rate
was 74.44% for consumer products, 69.02% for industrial products, 68.95% for consumer
inconvenience products, and as high as 88.38% for consumer convenience products.
In supply chain and marketing problems, a key question for manufacturers in this context
is to determine what should be its optimal subsidy rate policy for its retailers. Accordingly,
the related question for a retailer is to decide its optimal advertising policy, given the level
of support offered by a manufacturer. These questions become even more relevant and
challenging when a) these decision makers are in a dynamic market where the sales and
market share evolves with time and its evolution depends on these decisions, and b) when
these decision makers face competition. We attempt to address these issues in this paper.
1http://marketingland.com/report-billions-in-co-op-advertising-funds-left-unspent-each-year-138671
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We study cooperative advertising in a market that consists of a finite number of independent
manufacturers and retailers. There is, thus, competition at manufacturer as well as retailer
level. We formulate the problem as a Stackelberg differential game with the manufacturers
as leaders and retailers as followers. First, a Nash game ensues between the manufacturers
where each manufacturer determines its level of support (subsidy rate) for all the competing
retailers. This is followed by a Nash game between competing retailers where each retailer
responds to all the manufacturers’ decisions to decide the local advertising effort for each
manufacturer’s product. We obtain optimal subsidy rates policy for all the manufacturers
and optimal advertising efforts for all the retailers. In an extension, we also study the
case when the manufacturer also carries national level advertising in addition to the local
advertising by the retailer.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the background
literature on game theoretic models in cooperative advertising and also highlight our contri-
bution vis-a`-vis the extant literature. In Section 3, we describe the general model and solve
it to obtain the underlying set of algebraic equations characterizing a feedback Stackelberg
equilibrium. We also investigate the incentives for cooperation for the manufacturers and
in some special cases, investigate the role of different model inputs including the level of
competition. In Section 4, in a case of two manufacturers and two retailers, we investigate
the sensitivity of subsidy rates by the manufacturers for all retailers with respect to different
model parameters. In Section 5, we examine the profit of each player with and without a
cooperative advertising program. In Section 6, we extend our model to incorporate national
level advertising by the manufacturers in addition to the local advertising by the retailers
and obtain the optimal national and local advertising policies. We finally conclude the paper
in Section 7. All figures (except Figure 1) that depict analytical insights are relegated to the
end for ease of reading.
2 Background Literature
For a wider and detailed review of literature on cooperative advertising models of all types,
the readers are referred to the recent survey papers by Aust and Buscher (2014 a) and
Jørgensen and Zaccour (2014). In this segment however, our discussion is focussed on coop-
erative advertising game models in supply chain with competition. While the game theoretic
modelling of coop advertising is a widely researched area which goes back to Berger (1972),
the focus on coop advertising models under the presence of competition is a relatively new
development. Examples of static models with one manufacturer and multiple retailers in-
clude Wang et al. (2011), Zhang and Xie (2012), Ghadimi et el. (2013), Aust and Buscher
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(2014 b), and Karray and Amin (2015). Dynamic models with one manufacturer and mul-
tiple retailers include Sigue´ and Chintagunta (2009), He et al. (2011), He et al. (2012),
Chutani and Sethi (2012a, 2012b), and Chutani and Sethi (2014). While there are a few
models with retail level competition as listed above, it is noticeable that there are even fewer
ones which account for manufacturer level competition. There are some examples of static
models which account for competition between two manufacturers. Bergen and John (1997)
considered a model with two manufacturers and two retailers where each product consists
of two attributes (dimensions): one representing attributes from the two retailers and the
other representing manufacturers. Thus, there are four possible customer offerings located
at the four corners of the product space, which is a two dimensional square; and the cus-
tomers are located uniformly throughout the square. They focus on studying the impacts
on the optimal subsidy rates. Kim and Staelin (1999) modelled a Stackelberg game with
two manufacturers (leaders) and two retailers (followers). In their paper, the cooperative
advertising appears in terms of direct allowances paid by the manufacturers to the retailers.
They focus on the retailer “pass-through” rates which denote the fraction of manufacturer
allowances that the retailers pass on to the consumers in the form of more features, more shelf
space, price cuts etc. Karray and Zaccour (2007) study a two manufacturer - two retailer
Stackelberg game and account for brand and store substitution effects due to the retailers’
advertising. They also study the impact of coop advertising programs on the payoffs of the
manufacturers and retailers. In the case of homogeneous manufacturers and homogeneous
retailers, they find that if the brand substitution rate is high enough the coop advertising
programs are examples of prisoner’s dilemma and that coop advertising programs lead to
an increase in retailers’ profits only when the store substitution rate is not too high. There
are papers on coop advertising with competition in the case of dual exclusive supply chains
(see, for e.g., Yan et al. (2006), Chutani and Sethi (2012 b), Liu et al. (2014), Chen (2015),
Karray (2015), and Karray et al. (2017)). However, in these dual-channel settings, each
of the two manufacturers sells exclusively through its retailer and each of the two retailers
carries only one manufacturer’s product. As mentioned earlier, all the above models with
two manufacturers, however, are static in nature.
In this paper, we study dynamic cooperative advertising decisions in a market with a finite
number of independent manufacturers (Ns) and retailers (Nr). Every manufacturer can sell
its product through all the retailers and can offer advertising support to all of them. Similarly,
every retailer can sell the products of all the manufacturers and can spend on local advertising
for every manufacturer’s product. This aspect is absent in the dual exclusive supply chain
papers with two manufacturers and two retailers, as mentioned above. By considering such
a generalized setting in a dynamic environment, we make some key contributions to the
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existing literature on cooperative advertising, as highlighted below. As discussed previously
and also noted in the extensive survey by Jørgensen and Zaccour (2014), while there are some
coop advertising papers involoving static game-theoretic models with two manufacturers and
two retailers and differential game models with a single manufacturer and multiple retailers;
to the best of our knowledge, ours is the only paper analysing a dynamic game with multiple
manufacturers and multiple retailers at the same time. We are therefore able to assess the
relative impacts of competition at brand as well as at retail level on coop advertising decisions.
In some special cases, by considering different values of Ns, Nr, and other model parameters,
we are able to obtain useful insights regarding coop advertising decisions and incentives as the
level of competition changes at both manufacturer (Ns) and retailer (Nr) level. We also study
the impacts of a coop advertising program on the profits of all the players. As discussed
previously, Karray and Zaccour (2007) consider a static model with 2 manufacturers and
show that coop advertising programs may be due to a prisoner’s dilemma situation for the
manufacturers. In their survey paper, Jørgensen and Zaccour (2014) highlight the need
for “research efforts that extend existing models to include horizontal competition between
manufacturers and retailers” and ask “if coop programs are simply prisoner’s dilemma trap
for competing manufacturers?” Adding to the existing knowledge on this issue, in a case of
two manufacturers and two retailers, we find that a manufacturer may or may not benefit
from a coop advertising program and it is possible that one manufacturer benefits whereas
the other does not; and this depends on various model parameters. Furthermore, in the
case of two manufactures and two retailers, through numerical study we also obtain useful
managerial insights on the impacts of different parameters on the subsidy rates offered by the
manufacturers for all retailers. We also extend our original model to include national level
advertising by manufacturer as well. There are some coop advertising papers which consider
national level advertising as well, examples of which include Huang et al. (2002), Karray and
Zaccour (2005), Ezimadu and Nwozo (2017), Zhang et al. (2017). However, once again to the
best of our knowledge, ours is the only paper that considers national level advertising with
coop local advertising, and also accounts for competition at both levels. We obtain some
interesting insights on how both types of advertising decisions change with competition and
other model parameters. Finally, despite the complexity of a network type supply chain
structure with multiple players at each echelon with a complete bipartite nature, we are still
able to obtain feedback Stackelberg strategies for the manufacturers and the retailers.
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3 General formulation with multiple manufacturers and
multiple retailers
We formulate the problem for a general case with Ns manufacturers and Nr retailers. The
sequence of events is as follows. Each manufacturer first announces its subsidy rate for each
retailer, and the retailers in response decide their advertising efforts over time for the products
of all the manufacturers. The advertising effort for any retailer for any particular brand
boosts the sales of that product brand by the concerned retailer and increases its proportional
market share. A Stackelberg differential game is thus played between the manufacturers and
the retailers with manufacturers as the leaders and the retailers following their decisions
to decide on their advertising efforts over time. Furthermore, two Nash differential games
are also being played out in our model. The first between the manufacturers to decide on
their subsidy rates for the retailers, and the second between the retailers to decide their
advertising effort for each brand they sell. Figure 1 depicts the problem structure and the
types of games being played by the parties. We introduce the key notations below.
t Time t ∈ [0,∞)
Ns number of manufacturers
Nr number of retailers
i, k, g subscripts used to tag manufacturers, i, k, g = 1, 2, · · · , Ns
j, l, h subscripts used to tag retailers, j, l, h = 1, 2, · · · , Nr
xij(t) ∈ [0, 1] proportional market share of sales of manufacturer i’s product via retailer j
X ∈ [0, 1] =
Ns∑
i=1
Nr∑
j=1
xij(t), the proportion of the total market captured
Mij manufacturer i’s unit margin from sales of manufacturer i’s product by retailer j
mij retailer j’s unit margin from sales of manufacturer i’s product by retailer j
ρij > 0 advertising effectiveness parameter of retailer j for manufacturer i’s product
δij ≥ 0 market share decay parameter corresponding xij
r > 0 discount rate
uij(t) retailer j’s advertising effort for manufacturer i’s product at time t
θij(t) ≥ 0 manufacturer i’s subsidy rate for retailer j at time t
Vsi value function of manufacturer i
Vrj value function of retailer j
6
θˆij =
2∂Vsi
∂xij
− ∂Vrj
∂xij
2∂Vsi
∂xij
+
∂Vrj
∂xij
Mfg 1 
Mfg Ns 
Mfg i 
Ret 1 
Ret Nr 
Ret j 
θ11 
θ1j 
θ1Nr 
θij 
θi1 
θiNr 
θNsNr 
θNs1 
θNsj 
u11 
ui1 
uNs1 
u1j 
uij 
uNsj 
u1Nr 
uiNr 
uNsNr 
N 
A 
S 
H 
STACKELBERG 
N 
A 
S 
H 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
Figure 1: model
To model the impact of advertising efforts by the retailers on the evolution of market
shares, we take inspiration from the Sethi (1983) advertising model and its extensions in
Erickson (2009 a, b). Erickson (2009 a) presented an oligopolistic extension of the monopoly
model of Sethi (1983) and used it to study advertising competition between different brands
in the American beer industry. Erickson (2009 b) further extended the Erickson (2009
a) model to incorporate multiple brands sold by each competitor, and applied it to the
carbonated soft drinks market. Our framework is based on these papers and includes the
advertising competition at two levels, i.e., multiple brands advertised by the same retailer
and multiple retailers advertising each brand. We write down the state dynamics for the
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market shares as follows
x˙ij =
dxij
dt
= ρijuij
√
1−X − δijxij, ∀i = 1, 2, · · · , Ns, j = 1, 2, · · · , Nr, (1)
where xij represents the proportional market share of the sales of manufacturer i’s product
by retailer j w.r.t. the total market potential which is normalized to one. Clearly, the total
market share of manufacturer i is
∑Nr
j=1 xij, and the same for retailer j is
∑Ns
i=1 xij. The
parameter ρij represents the advertising effectiveness of local advertising done by retailer j
for the product of manufacturer i. This coefficient be a function of the medium of advertising
chosen by the retailer. δij represents the decay of the market share xij due to various factors
such as competition (retailer or brand level), changing consumer preferences etc. The cost of
advertising is written as the square of advertising effort. This cost structure is very common
in literature and captures the marginally diminishing returns of advertising. We can now
write, for i = 1, 2, · · · , Ns, manufacturer i’s optimal control problem
max
θij(t)∈[0,1]
j=1,2,··· ,Nr
Jsi =
∞∫
t=0
e−rt
[
Nr∑
j=1
[
Mijxij(t)− θij(t)u2ij(t)
]]
dt
 , (2)
and for j = 1, 2, · · · , Nr, retailer j’s optimal control problem
max
uij(t | θkl(t),∀k,l)≥0
i=1,2,··· ,Nr
Jrj =
∞∫
t=0
e−rt
[
Ns∑
i=1
[
mijxij(t)− (1− θij(t))u2ij(t)
]]
dt
 , (3)
both subject to the state dynamics in (1).
We focus on the optimal feedback policies of all manufacturers and retailers. This implies
that we will look ∀i = 1, 2, · · · , Ns and j = 1, 2, · · · , Nr, the optimal subsidy rates in the form
θij
(
xkl(t), k = 1, 2, · · · , Ns, l = 1, 2, · · · , Nr
)
, and the optimal advertising efforts in the form
uij
(
xkl(t), k = 1, 2, · · · , Ns, l = 1, 2, · · · , Nr | θgh, g = 1, 2, · · · , Ns, h = 1, 2, · · · , Nr
)
. How-
ever, to simplify the notation and presentation, we will simply refer to them as θij, and uij,
respectively. We now write the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for manufacturer
i as
rVsi = max
θij
j=1,2,···Nr
[
Nr∑
j=1
(
Mijxij − θiju2ij
)
+
Ns∑
k=1
Nr∑
j=1
∂Vsi
∂xkj
(
ρkjukj
√
1−X − δkjxkj
)]
, (4)
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and the HJB equation for retailer j as
rVrj = maxuij
i=1,2,···Ns
[
Ns∑
i=1
(
mijxij − (1− θij)u2ij
)
+
Ns∑
i=1
Nr∑
l=1
∂Vrj
∂xil
(
ρiluil
√
1−X − δilxil
)]
, (5)
where Vsi ≡ Vsi
(
xkl(t), k = 1, 2, · · · , Ns, l = 1, 2, · · · , Nr
)
, and Vrj ≡ Vrj
(
xkl(t), k = 1, 2, · · · , Ns, l =
1, 2, · · · , Nr
)
, denote the value functions of manufacturer i, and retailer j, respectively. Using
backward induction, we first solve the retailers’ problems. Given the subsidy rates by the
manufacturers, solving the first-order condition (f.o.c.) w.r.t. uij yield the retailers’ optimal
advertising efforts
u∗ij =
∂Vrj
∂xij
ρij
√
1−X
2(1− θij) , i = 1, 2, · · ·Ns; j = 1, 2, · · ·Nr. (6)
It can be easily verified that the second-order-conditions are also satisfied.2 Using (6), we
rewrite equations (5) and (4), respectively, as
rVrj =
Ns∑
i=1
(
mijxij −
(
∂Vrj
∂xij
)2ρ2ij(1−X)
4(1− θij)
)
+
Ns∑
i=1
Nr∑
l=1
∂Vrj
∂xil
(
∂Vrl
∂xil
ρ2l (1−X)
2(1− θil) − δilxil
)
, (7)
rVsi = max
θij
j=1,2,···Nr
 Nr∑
j=1
(
Mijxij −
θij(
∂Vrj
∂xij
)2ρ2j(1−X)
4(1− θij)2
)
+
Ns∑
k=1
Nr∑
j=1
∂Vsi
∂xkj
 ∂Vrj∂xkj ρ2j(1−X)
2(1− θkj) − δkjxkj
 .
(8)
We now apply the f.o.c. in (8) w.r.t. θij and get the optimal subsidy rates as
θ∗ij = Max
[
θˆij, 0
]
, θˆij =
2∂Vsi
∂xij
− ∂Vrj
∂xij
2∂Vsi
∂xij
+
∂Vrj
∂xij
, i = 1, 2, · · ·Ns, j = 1, 2, · · ·Nr. (9)
It is easy to note that the solution of the first order conditions in (8) w.r.t. θij is equal to
2To verify the second order conditions, we look at the Hessian matrix for every retailer’s problem. For
retailer j, we can see that the second order derivatives of the right hand side in equation (5) are: ∂
2(.)
∂u2ij
=
−2(1 − θij) < 0 since it is expected to have θij < 1, as θij ≥ 1 would imply a very large advertising effort
by the retailer with all the cost borne by the manufacturer which will not be optimal for the manufacturer.
We can also see that ∂
2(.)
∂uij∂ukj
= 0,∀i 6= k. With these observations, we can conclude that the Hessian matrix
corresponding to the maximization problem for every retailer is negative definite, thereby satisfying the
second partial derivative test.
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θˆij. The second-order conditions for the manufacturers’ problems are also satisfied.
3 Taking
a cue from Sethi (1983), we conjecture value functions in linear forms as follows:
Vsi = Ai +
Ns∑
k=1
Nr∑
j=1
Bikjxkj, i = 1, 2, · · · , Ns, (10)
Vrj = αj +
Ns∑
i=1
Nr∑
l=1
βjilxil, j = 1, 2, · · · , Nr. (11)
With these forms of value functions, it is clear that
Bikj =
∂Vsi
∂xkj
, ∀i, k, j; i, k = 1, 2, · · · , Ns, j = 1, 2, · · · , Nr (12)
βjil =
∂Vrj
∂xil
, ∀j, i, l; j, l = 1, 2, · · · , Nr, i = 1, 2, · · · , Ns. (13)
Using (12)-(13), retailers’ optimal advertising efforts in (6) can now be rewritten as:
u∗ij =
βjijρij
√
1−X
2(1− θij) , i = 1, 2, · · ·Ns; j = 1, 2, · · ·Nr. (14)
We should note that in view of (10), ∀i, j, θˆij will be constant, even though in general they
can be functions of the state variables. We use (12)-(13) in (7)-(8), and then compare the
coefficients of xij,∀i, j, and the constant terms in value functions given by (7)-(8) with those
in (10)-(11). As a result we get the following set of (Ns+Nr)(1 +NsNr) non-linear algebraic
equations
rAi = −
Nr∑
h=1
θ∗ihβ
2
hihρ
2
ih
4(1− θ∗ih)2
+
Ns∑
g=1
Nr∑
h=1
Bigh
βhghρ
2
gh
2(1− θ∗gh)
(15)
(r + δil)Biil = Mil +
Nr∑
h=1
θ∗ihβ
2
hihρ
2
ih
4(1− θ∗ih)2
−
Ns∑
g=1
Nr∑
h=1
Bigh
βhghρ
2
gh
2(1− θ∗gh)
(16)
(r + δkl)Bikl =
Nr∑
h=1
θ∗ihβ
2
hihρ
2
ih
4(1− θ∗ih)2
−
Ns∑
g=1
Nr∑
h=1
Bigh
βhghρ
2
gh
2(1− θ∗gh)
k 6= i (17)
rαj = −
Ns∑
g=1
β2jgjρ
2
gj
4(1− θ∗gj)
+
Ns∑
g=1
Nr∑
h=1
βjgh
βhghρ
2
gh
2(1− θ∗gh)
(18)
3Similar to a retailer’s problem we consider the Hessian matrix for manufacturer i’s maximization problem,
and can see that ∂
2(.)
∂θ2ij
< 0 and ∂
2(.)
∂θij∂θil
= 0,∀j 6= l. The Hessian matrix will therefore be negative definite
and hence the second-order conditions for all the manufacturers’ problems are also satisfied.
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(r + δkj)βjkj = mkj +
Ns∑
g=1
β2jgjρ
2
gj
4(1− θ∗gj)
−
Ns∑
g=1
Nr∑
h=1
βjgh
βhghρ
2
gh
2(1− θ∗gh)
(19)
(r + δkl)βjkl =
Ns∑
g=1
β2jgjρ
2
gj
4(1− θ∗gj)
−
Ns∑
g=1
Nr∑
h=1
βjgh
βhghρ
2
gh
2(1− θ∗gh)
∀l 6= j (20)
θ∗ij = Max
[
θˆij, 0
]
, θˆij =
2Biij − βjij
2Biij + βjij
, i = 1, 2, · · ·Ns, j = 1, 2, · · ·Nr (21)
Referring to the verification theorem in Bensoussan et al. (2014), we can now conclude
the following result.
Proposition 1: For the manufacturers’ and retailers’ optimal control problems, given by
(2) and (3), respectively, both subject to (1), the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium is obtained
by solving the set of non-linear algebraic equations in (15)-(21). The manufacturers’ optimal
subsidy rates policies are given by (21), and the retailers’ optimal responses, i.e., their ad-
vertising efforts are given in (14). The value functions of all the players are linear in state
variables, and are obtained using (10) and (11).
In general, it is extremely difficult to get an explicit analytical solution to the system
of equations given by (15)-(21). However, a numerical analysis of this system of equations
can be carried out to get further insights in a cooperative solution. In subsection 3.1, we
consider a scenario of a non-cooperative equilibrium and obtain explicit solutions to these
equations in some special cases to understand the incentives for cooperation and get some
useful insights.
3.1 Non-cooperative equilibrium and incentives for cooperation
We investigate a complete non-cooperative equilibrium in which no manufacturer supports
any of its retailers, i.e., θij = 0,∀i, j. We look to understand the incentives for such complete
non-cooperation by understanding the conditions under which such an equilibrium will be
optimal. To this end, we solve the Stackelberg game while enforcing θ∗ij = 0, ∀i, j, in equations
(15)-(20). We then use the resulting values of coefficients from this solution and obtain the
values of θˆij,∀i, j, using (21). Recall that mathematically, θˆij is allowed to take negative
values. A complete non-cooperative equilibrium will thus be optimal if we have the resulting
θˆij ≤ 0, ∀i, j, which would then validate the starting premise that θ∗ij = 0,∀i, j. It can be
seen that the system of equations (15)-(20) is too complicated to get a closed form solution
even when we set θij = 0,∀i, j. Therefore, we apply some simplifications and consider some
special cases to understand the incentives for such an equilibrium (and the incentives to shift
towards advertising cooperation), and in particular, the role of competition towards these
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incentives.
3.1.1 Special case: symmetric retailers and symmetric manufacturers
In the special case when mij = m, Mij = M, ρij = ρ, and δij = δ, ∀i, j, we can say that
∀i, k = 1, 2, · · · , Ns, k 6= i, and ∀j, l,= 1, 2, · · · , Nr, j 6= l,
βjij = β, βjil = γ, Biij = B, Bikj = G, and θˆij = θˆ.
Under a non-cooperative equilibrium, we use θ∗ij = 0,∀i, j, in equations (15)-(20) and obtain
the following
β =
m(Nr − 1)Nsρ2 + (r + δ)
[
−2(r + δ) +
√
4(r + δ)2 + 4mNrNsρ2 +
m2(Nr−1)2N2s ρ4
(r+δ)2
]
(2Nr − 1)Ns(r + δ)ρ2 (22)
B = M
2(Ns −Nr)(r + δ)2 +mNrNsρ2(2Ns −Nr − 1) +Nr(r + δ)
√
4(r + δ)2 + 4mNrNsρ2 +
m2(Nr−1)2N2s ρ4
(r+δ)2
2Ns(r + δ)((r + δ)2 +mNrNsρ2)
.
(23)
From equation (22), we can observe the following.
Corollary 1: ∂β/∂Ns < 0.
Corollary 1 can be obtained by taking the derivative w.r.t. Ns and after a few steps of alge-
bra. It implies that in a non-cooperative equilibrium, with all other parameters unchanged,
an increase in the number of products (brands) decreases the marginal utility for the retailers
w.r.t. an increment in sales. In other words, the benefit for a retailer due to a small increase
in market share decreases as the brand level competition increases. This has implications for
the advertising efforts by the retailers. With higher brand level competition, the incentive for
a retailer to advertise more and increase its market share, therefore, decreases. One might
then argue that for higher Ns, given decreasing incentives for retailers, the manufacturers
would be more inclined to provide a positive (i.e., non-zero) subsidy rate to advertise more.
This in a nutshell would imply that θˆ increases with Ns and therefore we move towards
a cooperative equilibrium. However, it is difficult to prove the above statement through
analytic means with equation (23) in its current form. We can however further investigate
towards this insight through analytic means in a special case ((r + δ) ≈ 0), and numerical
means more generally ((r + δ) ≥ 0). This is discussed below in the rest of this subsection,
and in the subsection 3.1.2.
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Scenario A: (r + δ) ≈ 0
To get further insights, we consider the case when (r + δ) ≈ 0 Using (22)-(23) in (21), and
then applying (r + δ) ≈ 0, we obtain
θˆij =
M(2Nr − 1)(Ns − 1)−m(Nr − 1)Ns
M(2Nr − 1)(Ns − 1) +m(Nr − 1)Ns (24)
When θˆij < 0, ∀i, j in equation (24), a complete non-cooperative equilibrium will be optimal
where no manufacturer supports any of its retailer in its advertising efforts.
Equation (24) yields some interesting insights upon observation.
i. It is clear that θˆij increases with M and decreases with m, i.e., the incentives to shift
towards a cooperative equilibrium increase as the manufacturers get more margins
from sale and decrease as the retailers’ margins increase. This can be explained as
follows: the tendency of the manufacturers to support advertising efforts of retailers
will increase if they benefit more from a higher sale, and this tendency will decrease if
the retailers themselves have high incentives to advertise sufficiently due to their own
higher margins.
ii. θˆij > 0 always when Nr = 1 and Ns > 1. Thus, a non-cooperative equilibrium will never
be optimal when there is only one retailer and more than one manufacturers selling
their products, regardless of the number of manufacturers, margins, and other model
parameters.
iii. θˆij < 0 always when Ns = 1 and Nr > 1. Thus, a non-cooperative equilibrium will al-
ways be optimal when there is only one manufacturer and more than one retailers
selling that manufacturer’s product, regardless of the number of retailers, margins,
and other model parameters.
iv. Figure 2 shows the changes in θˆij for different values of Ns and Nr. Observations ii.
and iii. along with Figure 2 indicate that the likelihood of advertising cooperation
increases as Ns increases, and decreases as Nr increases.
Scenario B: More generally (r + δ) ≥ 0
In a more general scenario when (r + δ) ≥ 0, we used equations (22)-(23) to compute the
value of θˆij for a varied set of model parameters. In this case, Figure 3 shows the typical
pattern of changes in θˆij w.r.t. Ns and Nr, and Figures 4-11 show changes in θˆij w.r.t. model
parameters such as M,m, ρ, r, δ, for different values of Ns and Nr.
All these observations from both the cases, i.e., (r + δ) ≈ 0 and (r + δ) > 0, point
towards a common crucial insight on the role of competition towards the incentives for
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cooperation. It can be seen that the likelihood of advertising cooperation between the
upstream and downstream partners in a supply chain increases as the manufacturer level
competition increases, and decreases as the retail level competition increases. As more
retailers compete for the market share, the retailers themselves have enough incentives on
their own to advertise more, and therefore the manufacturers can afford to take a back-seat
and offer less (or no) support for the local advertising. On the other hand, for a higher
manufacturer level competition each manufacturer has a greater incentive to advertise its
product more, and therefore, there is a greater possibility of positive subsidy rates (or in
other words a non-zero subsidy rate) offered to its retailers.
3.1.2 Special case: single retailer, non-symmetric manufacturers
In this case, we assume that ρi1 = ρ1 and δi1 = δ1, ∀i = 1, 2, · · · , Ns. However, the manufac-
turers need not be symmetric as we can have different margins, i.e., Mi1 6= Mk1, i 6= k, i, k =
1, 2, · · · , Ns. We can solve equations (15)-(21) in a non-cooperative case to obtain
β1i1 = 2
−(r + δ1) +
√
(r + δ1)2 +Nsρ21Ck
Nsρ21
,
where,
Ci = mi1 +
Ns∑
g=1
g 6=i
[
2
(
mi1 −mg1
r + δ1
)
−
(
mi1 −mg1
r + δ1
)2]
,
and
Bii1 =
2Mi1 +
ρ21Mi1
(r+δ1)
∑Ns
g=1
g 6=i
β1g1
2(r + δ1) + ρ21
∑Ns
g=1 β1g1
.
Furthermore, for a special case with mi1 = m the above expressions can be further simplified
as follows.
β1i1 = 2
−(r + δ) +√(r + δ)2 +Nsmρ2
Nsρ2
∀i = 1, 2, · · · , Ns, (25)
Bii1 =
Mi1
Ns
(
Ns − 1
(r + δ)
+
1√
(r + δ)2 +Nsmρ2
)
∀i = 1, 2, · · · , Ns. (26)
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Using (25) and (26) in (21), we also get ∀i = 1, 2, · · · , Ns,
θˆi1 =
−(r + δ1)3 + (Mi1 −mNs)(r + δ1)ρ21 + (r + δ1)2
√
(r + δ1)2 +mNsρ21 +Mi1(Ns− 1)ρ21
√
(r + δ1)2 +mNsρ2
(r + δ1)3 + (Mi1 +mNs)(r + δ1)ρ21 − (r + δ1)2
√
(r + δ1)2 +mNsρ21 +Mi1(Ns− 1)ρ21
√
(r + δ1)2 +mNsρ2
(27)
From (26) and (27), we can obtain the following result.
Corollary 2: ∂Bii1/∂Ns > 0 and ∂θˆi1/∂Ns > 0. Furthermore, limNs→∞ θˆi1 = 1.
Corollary 2 can be obtained by taking derivatives and limit w.r.t. Ns and after a few steps
of algebra. It implies that in this particular case, under a non-cooperative equilibrium,
the marginal benefit for manufacturers w.r.t. market share increases as manufacturer level
competition increases. This is contrary to the result for retailers as shown in Corollary 1.
Moreover, with the fact that ∂θˆi1/∂Ns > 0, it is clear that as manufacturer level competition
increases the tendency for the manufacturers to support the retailers increases and we move
towards a cooperative equilibrium. Note that this result is for all values of r and δ, and
even when the margins for the manufacturers are different. Finally, we find that if the
number of manufacturers (brands) is very large, we are guaranteed to have a cooperative
equilibrium. Under extremely high manufacturer level competition, the manufacturers will
not only support the retailer, but will also tend towards taking the entire burden of local
advertising.
4 Sensitivity analysis of subsidy rates: a case of two
manufacturers and two retailers
In this section we study the impact of various model parameters on all the subsidy rates
decisions of manufacturers in a two manufacturer two retailer channel. As it was mentioned
previously, it is extremely difficult to obtain an explicit solution to the system of equations
(15)-(21) in the general case. We therefore, resort to numerical analysis of these equations
to get some insights. We performed numerical analysis for a large set of model parameters
and in this section present some representative examples, depicting key insights obtained
from all the instances that we studied. The numerical analysis was done using Mathematica
10.4. To study the impact of a single parameter, we focus on changing that parameter while
keeping others constant. For illustration, we present the results from numerical analysis for
two sets of model parameters. Figures 12-15 show results from one set of model parameters
and Figures 16-19 from a second set of model parameters. We would like to highlight that
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for the second set of parameters (Figures 16-19), we take a cue from Erickson (2009 a). As
mentioned earlier, Erickson (2009 a) studied an oligopolistic extension of the Sethi (1983)
model and used it to study advertising competition between different brands in the American
beer industry. Using real data on advertising expenditures by Anheuser-Busch, Miller, and
Coors, their margins etc., Erickson (2009 a) estimated various model parameters for the
sales dynamics such as advertising effectiveness and decay rate. The values of parameters
in data set 2 follow the corresponding values reported in Erickson (2009 a). We report our
key findings and insights below. It is noticeable that compared to data set 1, the magnitude
of changes in subsidy rates are much less in data set 2. However, prominent trends are
consistent in both examples.
Impact of M11 (Figures 12, 16): As M11 increases, manufacturer 1’s incentive for an
increase in sales via retailer 1 increases, and therefore, manufacturer 1 increases its subsidy
rate for retailer 1. Manufacturer 1 also decreases its subsidy rate for retailer 2 as retailer
2’s advertising yields comparatively less marginal returns. The changes in the subsidy rates
by the competing manufacturer are comparatively much less pronounced. We find that
manufacturer 2 slightly increases his subsidy rate for retailer 1 to counter greater advertising
efforts by retailer 1 for manufacturer 1 due to higher θ11. θ22 depicts a much more stable
behaviour and does not change much, however the slight change (if any) appears to be in
the downward direction.
Impact of m11 (Figures 13, 17): As m11 changes, major impacts are mainly observed in
θ11 and θ21, i.e., subsidy rates for retailer 1. As m11 increases, retailer 1 itself has a higher
incentive of its own to increase advertising of product 1 and sell it more. Manufacturer
1 anticipates this and reduces the subsidy rate for retailer 1. To compensate for possible
higher levels of u11 (due to higher m11), the competition forces manufacturer 2 to incentivize
retailer 1 to increase u21, and therefore manufacturer 2 increases his subsidy rate. Hence,
by and large, changes in m11 leads to somewhat opposite effect on subsidy rates by the
two competing manufacturers. We also observe a small downward trend in θ12, whereas θ22
remains comparatively stable
Impact of ρ11 (Figures 14, 18): As ρ11 increases, we find that θ21 increases. It can be
argued that as retailer 1’s advertising for manufacturer 1 becomes more effective, manufac-
turer 2 counters this higher “quality” of advertising for product 1 by a higher “quantity” of
advertising of its own product through retailer 1, and therefore increases his subsidy rate.
We also find that manufacturer 1 decreases its subsidy rate for retailer 2 as effectiveness of
retailer 1’s effort increases.
Impact of δ11 (Figures 15, 19): From the state dynamics, it is clear that for same levels of
advertising, an increase in δ11 has a negative impact on x11 as opposed to the positive impact
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due to increase in ρ11. This explains the fact that the effects of changes in δ11 on subsidy
rates appear to be opposite of that of changes in ρ11. We find a clear trend of decrease in θ21
and increase in θ12.
5 Impact of coop advertising programs on payoffs and
the role of competition
The decision to offer advertising support to a retailer is obviously dependent upon the benefit
it may bring to the manufacturer towards his profit function. It is easy to say that when
there is only one manufacturer, positive subsidy rate(s) clearly implies that the manufacturer
is better off with a cooperative advertising arrangement than without it. In the presence of
manufacturer level competition though, this decision is clearly a function of the actions taken
by other manufacturers as well. To further investigate this question and examine the role of
competition (at both the manufacturer as well as the retailer level) in our dynamic setting,
we studied and compared the value functions of the players in a cooperative equilibrium
(with positive optimal subsidy rates) and those in a non cooperative scenario.
We define VsiC as manufacturer i’s value function with cooperative advertising and VsiN
as their value functions when there is no coop advertising arrangement. Similarly, we define
VrjC and VrjN as retailer j’s value function with and without a coop advertising arrangement,
respectively. VsiC and VriC are obtained by solving equations (15)-(21) and then using (10)-
(11). To obtain VsiN and VriN , we solve (15)-(21) while enforcing using θij = 0,∀i, j. and
then use the resulting solution in (10)-(11).
5.1 Impact of manufacturer and retail level competition in the
case of symmetric manufacturers and symmetric retailers
To gauge the impact of competition, we compared value functions in coop and non coop
equilibrium for several values of Ns and Nr, while keeping all the model parameters at a
symmetric level for manufacturers and retailers, i.e., Mij = M,mij = m, ρij = ρ, δij =
δ, ∀i, j, i = 1, 2, · · · , Ns, j = 1, 2, · · · , Nr. To focus on Ns and Nr, we also assumed equal
initial state for all the state variables, i.e., xij = x, ∀i, j, i = 1, 2, · · · , Ns, j = 1, 2, · · · , Nr. It
is to be noted that under these circumstances, the value functions of all the manufacturers
are equal and similarly those of all the retailers are equal as well.
In this case of symmetric manufacturers and symmetric retailers, a non cooperative equi-
librium can be easily obtained in an explicit form using the results in Section 3.1.1. For
a cooperative equilibrium, however, we once again have to turn to numerical analysis of
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equations (15)-(21), which we performed for a wide array of parameters. In all the instances
we found that the manufacturers are always worse off with a coop advertising program
than without it. The % decrease in manufacturer’s profit due in a coop advertising pro-
gram, i.e., 100 ∗ (VsiN−VsiC)
VsiN
depends not only on the level of competition at two levels, but
also on the way competition impacts the total captured market. In this regard, we consid-
ered two cases. In the first case, the entry of say a new competitor proportionally reduces
the market share of all the previous brands, while keeping the overall captured market
share, i.e., X =
∑Ns
i=1
∑Nr
j=1 xij, remained constant. E.g., if there are two manufacturers
and two retailers, and if the initial state variable has the value of 0.15 for all sales streams,
i.e., xij = 0.15, ∀i, j = 1, 2, =⇒ X = 0.6, an entry of a third manufacture will mean:
X = 0.6 =⇒ xij = 0.1,∀i = 1, 2, 3, j = 1, 2. Figures (20) and (21) show typical behavior of
the loss in the value functions of all the manufactures in this case when the total captured
market is “high” (X = 0.8), and “low” (X = 0.2), respectively. We find that as the level of
manufacturer competition increases, the loss to each manufacturer due to a coop advertising
program increases. The second case is when the entry of a new brand (competitor) does not
affect the market shares of the existing manufacturers, but captures a new market segment,
thereby increasing the total captured market. Here we assume that the initial values of all
the state variables are equal, including that of the new entrant. E.g., say if there are two
manufacturers and two retailers and the initial state variable has the value of 0.1 for all sales
streams, i.e., xij = 0.1,∀i, j = 1, 2, =⇒ X = 0.4, an entry of a third manufacture will mean:
xij = 0.1,∀i = 1, 2, 3, j = 1, 2, =⇒ X = 0.6. Figure (22) shows a typical observed pattern
in this case. The % loss for each manufacturer increases with competition at low values of
Ns, but at high levels of competition the loss may actually start to decrease, which could be
attributed to the increase in the total captured market due to a new competitor. Regarding
the retailers’ value functions, we find that the retailers benefit in all instances when there is
a manufacturer level competition, i.e., Ns ≥ 2.
5.2 A case of two manufacturers and two retailers, asymmetric
players
In the case of two manufacturers and two retailers, we compared the value functions with
and without coop advertising while changing different model parameters. To focus on the
impact of a particular model parameter, say, e.g. M11, we start with a base case of symmetric
players, i.e., Mij = M,mij = m, ρij = ρ, δij = δ, xij = x, ∀i, j = 1, 2, and then change the
value of that particular parameter to consider asymmetric nature of players. Again, we
considered a wide array variety of parameters to solve equations (15)-(21) in coop and non
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coop scenarios, and summarize our key observations through some representative results
shown in Figures 23-30, which depict the ratio of coop to non coop value functions. The
impact of a parameter on the benefit of a coop advertising program for different players can
be related to its impact on the optimal subsidy rates in a coop advertising programs (Section
4).
Impact of M11 (Figures 23, 24): We find that both manufactures are worse off with coop
advertising as long as their margins are “not too different”. However, for larger differences
in the margins, we find that the manufacturer who earns a substantially higher margin as
compared to its competitor may actually benefit from coop advertising while its competitor
loses. At high values of M11, manufacturer 1 is better off with coop advertising while manu-
facturer 2 is worse off. We find that if M11 is large (small) enough, retailer 2(1) might start
to lose from a coop advertising arrangement. This could be related to our observations in
Section 4 (Figure 12). As M11 increases, there is overall more support for retailer 1 while
less for retailer 2, and so retailer 1 gains more from a coop advertising program and retailer
2 might actually lose from it.
Impact of m11 (Figures 25, 26): As m11 increases and gets large enough, manufacturer
1 might lose from coop advertising and manufacturer 2 might start gaining from it. As has
been discussed previously, higher m11 implies a higher incentive for retailer 1 to advertise
for manufacturer 1, and therefore the incentive for the manufacturer 1 to offer a positive
subsidy rate decreases. Interestingly, a high margin for one of the products (m11) for retailer
1 might mean that the retailer is better off without coop advertising. It should be noted
that as m11 increases, the profit for retailer 1 increases in both the scenarios, i.e., with and
without coop advertising.
Impact of ρ11 (Figures 27, 28) and δ11 (Figures 29, 30): Similar to our observations
regarding the subsidy rates, changes in ρ11 and δ11 appear to have opposite effects on the ratio
of coop to non-coop value functions. These observations could be tied to the fact that ρ11 has
a positive impact on the market share x11 and δ11 has a negative impact on it. At low values of
ρ11, it is possible that manufacturer 1 is better off with coop advertising while manufacturer
2 is worse off, and vice versa. As ρ11 increases, the benefit from a coop advertising program
increases for retailer 1 and decreases for retailer 2. Opposite trends are obtained w.r.t. δ11.
The larger insight appears to be the following. When there is a greater ‘need’ for higher
advertising (due to low effectiveness or high decay rate) for manufacturer 1 through retailer 1,
then manufacturer 1 might be better off with a coop advertising arrangement as such program
will lead to overall higher advertising efforts thereby satisfying its ‘need’. Furthermore, in
that case, an overall low level of advertising might be better for manufacturer 2 (as low
advertising levels will hurt manufacturer 1), and therefore manufacturer 2 might be worse
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off with a coop advertising program.
6 An Extension: Model with National advertising
In this segment we extend our model to include national advertising by the manufacturers in
addition to local level advertising carried by the retailers. We assume that each manufacturer,
say manufacturer i, carries a national advertising effort vi(t) which positively impacts its sales
through all the retailers with an appropriate national advertising effectiveness parameter
σi. The cost of this national advertising effort by manufacturer i is equal to v
2
i (t). Each
manufacturer now announces its national advertising effort and its subsidy rate for each
retailer, and the retailers in response decide their advertising efforts over time for the products
of all the manufacturers. We re-write the state dynamics (1) as,
x˙ij =
dxij
dt
=
(
ρijuij(t) + σivi(t)
)√
1−X − δijxij,
and the manufacturer i’s objective function (2) as.
max
θij(t)∈[0,1]
j=1,2,··· ,Nr
Jsi =
∞∫
t=0
e−rt
[
Nr∑
j=1
[
Mijxij(t)− θij(t)u2ij(t)
]− v2i (t)
]
dt
 ,
Retailer j’s objective function is same as (3). Similar to previous sections, to simplify the
analysis and presentation, we will simplify the notation and write the decision variables as
simply θij, vi, and ui in the rest of the section. We now re-write the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
(HJB) equations for manufacturer i (4) and retailer j (5), respectively, as
rVsi = max
θij
j=1,2,···Nr
[
Nr∑
j=1
(
Mijxij − θiju2ij
)− v2i + Ns∑
k=1
Nr∑
j=1
∂Vsi
∂xkj
(
(ρkjukj + σkvk)
√
1−X − δkjxkj
)]
,
(28)
rVrj = maxuij
i=1,2,···Ns
[
Ns∑
i=1
(
mijxij − (1− θij)u2ij
)
+
Ns∑
i=1
Nr∑
l=1
∂Vrj
∂xil
(
(ρiluil + σivi)
√
1−X − δilxil
)]
.
(29)
Following same procedure as in Section 3, we use backward induction to first obtain
optimal advertising efforts for all the retailers. We then use the optimal local advertising
efforts to rewrite HJB equations in (28) and (29), and then obtain optimal subsidy rates
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and national advertising effort for each manufacturer. The expressions for the optimal local
advertising efforts, and that of optimal subsidy rates are same as in the original model and
are given by equations (6) and (9), respectively. The optimal national advertising effort for
manufacturer i, ∀i, i = 1, 2, · · · , Ns, in feedback form is given by
v∗i =
σi
√
1−X
2
Nr∑
q=1
∂Vsi
∂xiq
. (30)
In equation (30), the term
∑Nr
q=1
∂Vsi
∂xiq
is the marginal benefit for manufacturer i w.r.t. total
market share through all the retailers, and manufacturer’s advertising effort increases as this
term increases. The national advertising effort does not depend on the impact of changes in
the market share through any single retailer, but on that of cumulative market share over
all the retailers.
Similar to Section 3, we consider linear value functions of the form (10)-(11). Using this
form of linear value functions and (12)-(13), we can write the national advertising efforts by
the manufacturers in (30) as
v∗i =
σi
√
1−X
2
Nr∑
q=1
Biiq. (31)
We then obtain the following set of non-linear equations in the value function coefficients,
similar to (15)-(21).
rAi =−
Nr∑
h=1
θ∗ihβ
2
hihρ
2
ih
4(1− θ∗ih)2
+
Ns∑
g=1
Nr∑
h=1
Bigh
βhghρ
2
gh
2(1− θ∗gh)
− σ
2
i
4
(
Nr∑
q=1
Biiq
)2
+
Ns∑
g=1
Nr∑
h=1
Bighσ
2
g
2
(
Nr∑
q=1
Bggq
)
(32)
(r + δil)Biil =Mil +
Nr∑
h=1
θ∗ihβ
2
hihρ
2
ih
4(1− θ∗ih)2
−
Ns∑
g=1
Nr∑
h=1
Bigh
βhghρ
2
gh
2(1− θ∗gh)
+
σ2i
4
(
Nr∑
q=1
Biiq
)2
−
Ns∑
g=1
Nr∑
h=1
Bighσ
2
g
2
(
Nr∑
q=1
Bggq
)
(33)
(r + δkl)Bikl =
Nr∑
h=1
θ∗ihβ
2
hihρ
2
ih
4(1− θ∗ih)2
−
Ns∑
g=1
Nr∑
h=1
Bigh
βhghρ
2
gh
2(1− θ∗gh)
+
σ2i
4
(
Nr∑
q=1
Biiq
)2
−
Ns∑
g=1
Nr∑
h=1
Bighσ
2
g
2
(
Nr∑
q=1
Bggq
)
k 6= i (34)
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rαj =−
Ns∑
g=1
β2jgjρ
2
gj
4(1− θ∗gj)
+
Ns∑
g=1
Nr∑
h=1
βjgh
βhghρ
2
gh
2(1− θ∗gh)
+
Ns∑
g=1
Nr∑
h=1
βjghσ
2
g
2
(
Nr∑
q=1
Bggq
)
(35)
(r + δkj)βjkj =mkj +
Ns∑
g=1
β2jgjρ
2
gj
4(1− θ∗gj)
−
Ns∑
g=1
Nr∑
h=1
βjgh
βhghρ
2
gh
2(1− θ∗gh)
−
Ns∑
g=1
Nr∑
h=1
βjghσ
2
g
2
(
Nr∑
q=1
Bggq
)
(36)
(r + δkl)βjkl =
Ns∑
g=1
β2jgjρ
2
gj
4(1− θ∗gj)
−
Ns∑
g=1
Nr∑
h=1
βjgh
βhghρ
2
gh
2(1− θ∗gh)
−
Ns∑
g=1
Nr∑
h=1
βjghσ
2
g
2
(
Nr∑
q=1
Bggq
)
∀l 6= j (37)
θ∗ij =Max
[
θˆij, 0
]
, θˆij =
2Biij − βjij
2Biij + βjij
, i = 1, 2, · · ·Ns, j = 1, 2, · · ·Nr (38)
We can then conclude that a feedback Stackelberg equilibrium is obtained by solving the
non-linear algebraic equations in (32)-(38). The manufacturer’s optimal subsidy rates are
given by (38), each manufacturer’s optimal national advertising effort is given by (31), and
the retailers’ optimal responses, i.e., their local advertising efforts can be obtained by (14). It
can be seen that the above system of equations (32)-(38) is far more complicated than (15)-
(21) with more complex terms involving interaction between manufacturers’ and retailers’
value function coefficients. It is very difficult to obtain a closed form analytical solution for
the above system of equations, even for a special case of identical retailers and identical man-
ufacturers as was done in Section 3. However, we can obtain useful insights by numerically
solving these equations. We discuss some of these insights in the following segment.
6.1 Numerical Analysis
We performed numerical analysis for a a wide set of model parameters and present here some
representative results depicting the wider insights that we obtained across all experiments.
We look at the impact of different model parameters on the local and national advertising
efforts and on the subsidy rates. Since the local and national advertising efforts depend on
overall uncaptured market share (
√
1−X), we analyze advertising efforts for unit value of
uncaptured market share, i.e., v∗/
√
1−X, and u∗/√1−X. In the case of identical retailers
and identical manufacturers, we also look at the ratios of the two advertising efforts and the
22
ratio of local and national advertising expenses. One can easily see that in these rations the
term that depends on X gets cancelled out.
(i) Impact of competition, a case of identical retailers and identical manufacturers (Figures
31 - 36).
To focus on the impact of changes in Ns and Nr, we analyze a case of identical manu-
factures and identical retailers with Mij = M,mij = m, ρij = ρ, σi = σ, δij = δ,∀i, j. We
find that as Ns or Nr increase, the local advertising effort by each retailer decreases and na-
tional advertising effort by each manufacturer increases. However, we find that the impact of
changes in Ns is much less in magnitude than the impact of changes in Nr. Figure 34 shows
Nr ∗ u which is the total local advertising effort by all retailers for any single manufacturer’s
product, for a unit uncaptured market. We find that as retailer level competition increases
the total local advertising for a particular brand increases, however, as the manufacturer
level competition increases the this total local advertising effort decreases at comparatively
very small rate. Figure (31) shows that as the manufacturer level competition increases, the
common subsidy rate increases. The impact of Nr however is not straightforward. In our
numerical experiments we find that at low levels of manufacturer level competition, the sub-
sidy rate decreases as the number of retailers increases, with all other parameters remaining
constant. However, when the number of brands is relatively high, the subsidy rate increases
as the number of retailers increases. To get grater insights on the relative dominance of
national vs local advertising, we also look at the ratios of total local vs national advertising,
and the ratio of total expenditure in local vs national advertising. Figure (35) shows the ratio
Nr ∗u/v, which is the ratio of total local advertising for a single brand by all Nr retailers over
the total national advertising by that manufacturer, and this is same for all brands as we are
dealing with the case of identical players. If we multiply Ns in both the numerator and the
denominator in this ratio, we can see that Nr ∗u/v is also the ratio of total local advertising
by all retailers over total national advertising by all manufactures in the market. Similarly,
Figure (36) depicts Nr ∗u2/v2 which is the total local advertising expense by all the retailers
for a single brand over the total national advertising for that brand. Nr ∗ u2/v2 is also equal
to the total local advertising expense over the total national advertising expense in the mar-
ket. We find that the behaviour of the ratio of total local over national advertising effort is
somewhat opposite of that of the common subsidy rate. This ratio marginally decreases as
Ns increases when Nr is fixed. At low values of Ns this ratio increases with the number of
retailers, whereas at relatively high values of Ns, it decreases with the number of retailers.
We also find that the ratio of total local over national advertising expense decreases with
the number of retailers and marginally decreases with the number of manufacturers.
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(ii) Impact of margins and advertising effectiveness, a case of two non-identical manufacturers
and two non-identical retailers (Figures 37 - 48).
(a) Impact of M11 (Figures 37-39): As M11 increases we observe that all subsidy rates by
the manufacturers increase (at different rates) with the exception of θ12 which is the subsidy
rate by manufacturer 1 to retailer 2. This pattern have been observed in the original model
(Section 4) as well. Following this pattern of incentives offered by the manufacturers, the
respective local advertising efforts also follow the same behaviour (Figure 38). Also, Figure
39 indicates that national advertising by both manufactures increase, as well as total local
advertising for both brand by the two retailers (by and large). A slight contrary result is
seen when M11 is too small for manufacturer 1 to offer any subsidy to retailer 1, and in this
zone as M11 increases the total local advertising for manufacturer 1 decreases due to heavy
decrease in u12 and a stable u11. However, once the margin M11 is large enough to have a
positive subsidy for retailer 1, the local advertising increases with M11 as significant increase
u11 overtakes the decrease in u12. We also observe that rate of increase of advertising for
product 1 (both national and total local) is higher than that for product 2.
(b) Impact of m11 (Figures 40-42): The changes in subsidy rates as m11 changes are very
similar to those in the original model (Section 4), i.e., θ11 decreases sharply, manufacturer
2 increases θ21 to fill the space left by manufacturer 1, and the subsidy rates for retailer
2 decrease at a small rate. As far as local advertising efforts are concerned, we see that
u11 increases due to higher incentive for retailer 1 (higher m11), and all the other local
advertising efforts decrease. In Figure 42 we see that the total local advertising effort for
product 1 increases (due to increase in u11). The total local advertising for product 2 and
the national advertising efforts by both the manufacturers decrease as m11 increases.
(c) Impact of ρ11 (Figures 43-45): The impact of changes in ρ11 on subsidy rates is very
similar to the original model in section 3, as shown in Figure 43. As product 1’s advertising
becomes more effective for retailer 1, it increases its local advertising for product 1. Because
of competition, manufacturer 2’s support to retailer1 and hence u21 also increase. Local
advertising by retailer 2 for both the product decreases due to lower incentives. Overall,
however, we find that the total local advertising for both the products increases. National
advertising by manufacturer 1 decreases but that by manufacturer 2 increases slightly.
(d) Impact of σ1 (Figures 46-48): As σ1 increases and therefore manufacturer 1’s na-
tional advertising becomes more effective, he finds greater value in increasing his national
advertising effort and reduces the support for the local advertising and the retailers follow by
reducing their advertising for manufacturer 1. Manufacturer 2 on the other hand increases
its subsidy rate for both the retailers and the retailers follow by increasing local advertising
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for retailer 2. Manufacturer 1 increases his national advertising effort as it becomes more
effective and the competition makes manufacturer 2 to increase its national advertising as
well. Manufacturer 1’s national advertising however increases at a higher rate than that of
manufacturer 2.
7 Concluding Remarks
Use of subsidy rates is a very useful and common mechanism used by manufacturers to sup-
port their retailers’ advertising efforts and influence their advertising decisions. While there
are several models to study subsidy rates decisions, relatively very few focus on competition
between manufacturers, and to the best of our knowledge, none that account for competition
at retailer and manufacturer levels simultaneously. We present a dynamic game involving an
arbitrary number of manufacturers and retailers. We obtain the optimal subsidy rates for
all the manufacturers and optimal advertising efforts for all the retailers in feedback form,
where the state variables represent proportional market shares. We obtain several useful
insights, sometimes by analytical and sometimes by numerical means. We investigate the
role of competition at the manufacturer as well as at the retailer level. A broader insight
appears that in a coop advertising arrangement, high competition at the manufacturer level
pushes the manufactures towards optimal positive subsidy rates, while higher competition
at the retailer level pushes towards lesser support. We find instances of cases when a co-
operation (or no-cooperation) is always optimal. We analyse the impact of various model
parameters on the optimal subsidy rates. We also study the benefit of a coop advertising
program on manufacturers and retailers, and find that it depends on the level of competition
and various other model parameters. Interestingly, our analysis indicates that as long as
the manufacturers and retailers are “somewhat symmetric/homogeneous” with respect to
their horizontal competition, the manufacturers always seem to lose from a coop advertising
program while the retailers seem to benefit from it. This creates a prisoner’s dilemma situa-
tion for the manufacturers in the case of symmetric manufacturers and symmetric retailers.
The extent of loss for the manufacturers also depends on the level of competition. However,
if there are sufficient differences between the manufacturers or retailers, it is possible that
one manufacturer benefits while the other loses, and similarly one retailer benefits while the
other loses from a cooperative advertising arrangement. This insight can create interesting
incentives for different players vis-a`-vis their parameters. For example, we find that manu-
facturer 1 may be better off with a coop advertising program and manufacturer 2 worse off if
M11 is high enough. If manufacturer 1 is aware of this, it is in its interest to push for a coop
advertising arrangement with its retailers. Manufacturer 2 might not like this arrangement
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but has to respond to it by following it as it loses more by not offering cooperation to its re-
tailers than by offering it. Finally, we extend our model to include national level advertising
in addition to local advertising carried by the retailers and obtain insights on how the two
types of advertising decisions change with different model parameters.
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Figures
Figure 2: θˆij vs Ns, Nr in non-cooperative equilibrium, symmetric players with (r + δ) ≈ 0
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Figure 3: θˆij vs Ns
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Figure 4: θˆij vs M(Nr = 1)
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Figure 5: θˆij vs M(Nr = 3)
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Figure 6: θˆij vs m(Nr = 1)
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Figure 7: θˆij vs m(Nr = 3)
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Figure 8: θˆij vs r + δ(Nr = 1)
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Figure 9: θˆij vs r + δ(Nr = 3)
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Figure 10: θˆij vs ρ(Nr = 1)
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Figure 11: θˆij vs ρ(Nr = 3)
Figure 12: θ∗ij vs M11 Figure 13: θ
∗
ij vs m11
Figure 14: θ∗ij vs ρ11 Figure 15: θ
∗
ij vs δ11
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Figure 16: θ∗ij vs M11 (dataset 2)
Figure 17: θ∗ij vs m11 (dataset 2)
Figure 18: θ∗ij vs ρ11 (dataset 2) Figure 19: θ
∗
ij vs δ11 (dataset 2)
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Figure 20: % decrease in each mfg’s profit
(coop vs noncoop) vs Ns,
∑
i,j xij = 0.8
Figure 21: % decrease in each mfg’s profit
(coop vs noncoop) vs Ns,
∑
i,j xij = 0.2
Figure 22: % decrease in each mfg’s profit (coop vs noncoop) vs Ns, xij = 0.01, ∀i, j
Figure 23: Ratio of Mfgs’ value functions
(coop/noncoop) vs M11
Figure 24: Ratio of Retailers’ value functions
(coop/noncoop) vs M11
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Figure 25: Ratio of Mfgs’ value functions
(coop/noncoop) vs m11
Figure 26: Ratio of Retailers’ value functions
(coop/noncoop) vs m11
Figure 27: Ratio of Mfgs’ value functions
(coop/noncoop) vs ρ11
Figure 28: Ratio of Retailers’ value functions
(coop/noncoop) vs ρ11
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Figure 29: Ratio of Mfgs’ value functions
(coop/noncoop) vs δ11
Figure 30: Ratio of Retailers’ value functions
(coop/noncoop) vs δ11
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Figures for Section 6
Figure 31: Subsidy rates for different Ns, Nr Figure 32: National advertising for a product
per unit uncaptured market share for different
Ns, Nr
Figure 33: Local advertising efforts per unit
uncaptured market share for different Ns, Nr
Figure 34: Total local advertising for a prod-
uct per unit uncaptured market share for dif-
ferent Ns, Nr
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Figure 35: Ratio of total local advertising over
national advertising for a product for different
Ns, Nr
Figure 36: Ratio of total local advertising ex-
pense over national advertising expense for a
product for different Ns, Nr
Figure 37: Subsidy rates vs M11 Figure 38: Local advertising efforts per unit
uncapturerd market share vs M11
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Figure 39: National and total local advertising for a product vs M11
Figure 40: Subsidy rates vs m11 Figure 41: Local advertising efforts per unit
uncapturerd market share vs m11
Figure 42: National and total local advertising for a product vs m11
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Figure 43: Subsidy rates vs ρ11 Figure 44: Local advertising efforts per unit
uncapturerd market share vs ρ11
Figure 45: National and total local advertising for a product vs ρ11
Figure 46: Subsidy rates vs σ1 Figure 47: Local advertising efforts per unit
uncapturerd market share vs σ1
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Figure 48: National and total local advertising for a product vs σ1
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